Aysun Ficici, C. Bulent Aybar


This study explores the value implications of good corporate governance for a sample of 54 ADR issuing emerging market firms (EMFs) from 9 countries primarily located in the regions of Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America and the and employs recently constructed company composite corporate governance metric along with some alternative corporate governance measures associated with the origin of the issuing firm. Although the ADR literature primarily focuses on the impact of subscription to US disclosure requirements we contend that company and country specific corporate governance standards play a significant role in the risk reduction and ensuing value capture.  The fundamental inquiry in this study has the following foci: The primary focus is on the impact of corporate governance structures on firm performance as to whether adherence to standards creates market value for ADR issuing EMFs.  Do good corporate governance practices affect the value of EMFs? The secondary focus is concerned with whether the impact of corruption level and legal system in a firm’s home country affect the corporate structures of EMFs thus affecting the market value of firms.  In this study, we utilize Tobin’s q as the measure of firm performance/market value.  Our findings suggest that there is a significant correlation between corporate governance structures of ADR issuing EMFs and their market values and/or performances.  The results also indicate that the level of corruption and legal structures in home countries of EMFs strongly impact the corporate governance structures of these firms and sequentially affect their market values. Therefore, this research further contributes to the scholarly findings and suppositions that corporate structures of firms do create consequences on firm value.

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