DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH IN FRANCHISING CONTRACTS IN EMERGING MARKETS; EVIDENCES FROM TURKEY

Authors

  • Sitki Sonmezer Beykent University
  • Vedat Akman Beykent University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5195/emaj.2012.23

Abstract

This study aims to examine the franchise sector and determine the significant factors that contribute to an increase in the number of franchiser’s contracts in Turkey. Secondary data is used from the Turkish Franchise Association and multivariate regression models are run for each sector. Our models explain the change in the number of franchise contracts with R2’s varying between .6577 and .7549. We provide evidence that success factors in increasing the number of contracts change depending on the sector firms operating in and contracts may be designed thusly to pursue success.

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Published

2012-02-03

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